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Reconciliation of the Penitent:
Sectarian Violence, Prisoner Release, and Justice
under the Good Friday Peace Accord
I. Introduction
Woe to him that claims obedience when it is not due;
Woe to him that refuses it when it is.'
On April 10, 1998, the British and Irish governments announced agreement on a
plan to end the political and military conflict in the six counties 2 of Northern Ireland. 3 If
successful, the Good Friday Peace Accord ("Good Friday")4 will end the so-called
'Troubles" 5 in Northern Ireland - a conflict that has claimed over three thousand lives in
the past three decades.6 The chance for success looks good: a majority of voters in the
Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland recently endorsed Good Friday in popular
referendums.
7
Nevertheless, obstacles remain. Good Friday is vague on some of the most conten-
tious issues that political leaders must confront to create a lasting peace.8 Furthermore,
dissenters threaten a return to hard-line positions and violent paramilitary operations.9
Earlier attempts at bringing peace in Northern Ireland have not met with lasting success.
1. CHALMERS JOHNSON, REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE (cover page) (1982) (quoting Thomas Carlyle).
2. The island of Ireland is politically divided: the six counties of Northern Ireland are part of the United
Kingdom; the twenty-six counties of the South constitute the Republic of Ireland. See, e.g., Christopher A.
Callanan, Note, Does Peace Have a Chance? Protection of Individual Rights as the Foundation for Lasting
Peace in Northern Ireland, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 87, 88 (1995) (discussing the political and geographic
divisions of Ireland in their historical context).
3. See T.R. Reid & Dan Balz, The Irish Vote on Peace Accord, WASH. POST, May 23, 1998, at A17
(noting that the April 10, 1998 agreement represents the conclusion of 22 months of negotiation between eight
political parties and the British and Irish governments).
4. Belfast Agreement, April 10, 1998, Ir.-U.K. (visited June 12, 1998) <http://www.irish-times.com/irish-
times /special/peace/agreement/agreement.html> [hereinafter Good Friday].
5. The conflict in Northern Ireland is often referred to simply as "the Troubles." See, e.g., T.R. Reid &
Dan Balz, Ireland's Twin Referendums, WASH. POST, May 22, 1998 at A35 (discussing recent developments
in the peace process in Northern Ireland).
6. See id. (noting that the conflict in Northern Ireland has claimed 3,400 lives since 1969). Estimations of
the death toll resulting from the Troubles range from approximately 3,000 to 3,600. See, e.g., John Hume,
Essay: Prospects for Peace in Northern Ireland, 38 ST. Louis LJ. 967, 968-69 (1994) (assessing the human
cost of the Troubles at approximately 30,000 maimed and 3,000 killed, 1,700 of whom were innocent
civilians); Carl Honore, Risks Ahead Reigning in Northern Ireland's Joy, HOUS. CHRON., May 25, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 3579267 (assessing the human cost of the Troubles at approximately 3,600).
7. See T.R. Reid & Dan Balz, Irish Peace Plan Wins by Big Margin, WASH. POST, May 24, 1998 at Al
(analyzing the popular referendums that took place in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland on May
22, 1998); see also infra text Part II: Background (discussing the recent developments in the peace process).
8. See Reid & Balz, supra note 7 (noting that the accord "includes a somewhat vague plan for disarming
the various paramilitary groups within two years and promises the eventual release of hundreds of sectarian
fighters locked up in Irish or British prisons." Id.); IRA Political Wing says Decommissioning arms "Dead-
End Issue," AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, May 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2288625 (noting that political leaders
from different sides of the debate have disparate views on the requirements for the decommissioning of
paramilitary units).
9. See Honore, supra note 6 ("Terrorist splinter gr6ups on both sides of the sectarian divide have sworn
to derail [Good Friday] with bombs and bullets.").
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In 1993, the British and Irish governments announced the Downing Street Declaration
("Downing Street") 10 to bring an end to the Troubles." In 1994, the Irish Republican
Army ("IRA") announced a military cease-fire to facilitate negotiations that would end
the conflict.12 In 1996, the IRA became dissatisfied with the British approach to nego-
tiations' 3 and ended the cease-fire by detonating two bombs in London.'4 In the investi-
gations that followed the bomb attack, police discovered that hard-liners within the IRA
had gained legitimacy during the cease-fire stemming from Republican dissatisfaction
with the British position; hard-liners were therefore able to convince their fellow terror-
ists to initiate a strike on London. Some investigators drew the conclusion that the attack
was done to quell dissent within the ranks of the IRA.'5
This comment evaluates the approach to justice developed under Good Friday by
analyzing the Northern Ireland Sentences Act of 1998 ("Sentences Act"). 16 A product of
Good Friday, the Sentences Act releases paramilitary prisoners convicted for terrorism.
Part II summarizes the historical background of the conflict in Northern Ireland and the
recent movements towards peace. Part III assesses the viability of Good Friday and de-
lineates systemic-level obstacles to the obtainment of justice. Part IV evaluates the ef-
fect these obstacles have on the Sentences Act by utilizing jurisprudential paradigms of
justice. Part V concludes that, although the Sentences Act may be part of a process to-
wards ending paramilitary violence, the Sentences Act has not yet achieved any mean-
ingful construction of justice for Ulster.
H. Background
A. The Origins of the British Presence in Ireland
The British presence in Ireland dates from the era following the Norman Invasion of
1066.17 In 1154, Pope Adrian IV granted Ireland to England's King Henry 1I.18 Four
hundred years later, England became a Protestant nation under the successors of King
Henry V1II, 19 while Ireland remained predominantly Roman Catholic. 20 Britain's control
10. Joint Declaration, Dec. 15, 1993, Ir.-U.K., reprinted in JOHN HUME, A NEW IRELAND 167 (1996)
[hereinafter Downing Street]. The Joint Declaration is commonly referred to as the Downing Street
Declaration. See Hume, supra note 6, at 972 n.2 (discussing the nomenclature of Downing Street).
11. See Clive Walker & Russell L. Weaver, A Peace Deal for Northern Ireland? The Downing Street
Declaration of 1993, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 817 (1994) (analyzing Downing Street as a means to peaceful
resolution of the Troubles).
12. See Ronald A. Christaldi, Comment, The Shamrock and the Crown: A Historic Analysis of the
Framework Document and Prospects for Peace in Ireland, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 123, 158 (1995)
(noting that the IRA initiated a cease-fire to enhance the democratic peace process).
13. See Suzanne Breen, Even Senior IRA Members Not Aware Bombing Was Planned, IRISH TIMES, Feb.
15, 1996, at 5. ("The British were given 18 months to sort out this problem but they did nothing.").
14. See Karen Donfried, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE
PEACE PROCESS 2 (updated April 20, 1998) (discussing the background to Good Friday).
15. See Breen, supra note 13 ("It might well have been only a matter of time before some [IRA members]
broke away and resumed violence independently. The hard-liners said there was a need to strike...in order to
avoid a split.").
16. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, 1998 (U.K.).
17. See JONATHAN BARDON, A HISTORY OF ULSTER 32 (1992) (discussing the history of Northern
Ireland); Christaldi, supra note 12, at 125 (describing the beginning of the Anglo-Irish conflict); J.M.
ROBERTS, A HISTORY OF EUROPE 174 (1996) (analyzing the effect of the Norman Invasion on England).
18. See BARDON, supra note 17, at 32 (discussing the history of Northern Ireland); Christaldi, supra note
12 at 125 (describing the beginning of the Anglo-Irish conflict).
19. See Christaldi, supra note 12, at 128-29 (describing the English Reformation, which made the Church
of England independent from Roman authority).
20. See JOHN F. GALLIHER & JERRY L. DEGREGORY, VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
UNDERSTANDING THE PROTESTANT PERSPECTIVE 2 (1985) (noting that the English Protestants endeavored to
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of Ireland's economic resources amplified religious tensions between the two regions. 2I
Additionally, British rule allowed large numbers of Protestants from Britain to settle in
Northern Ireland.22 This pattern of immigration, known as "the Plantation of Ulster, 23
created a divided society in which Protestants held political and economic power
throughout all of Ireland, forcing Catholics to endure repression until Britain initiated
reforms in the early-nineteenth century. 24 British reform centered on the Roman Catho-
lic Relief Act, which granted religious toleration and political equality to Roman Catho-
lics in England and Ireland.25
B. The Dawn of Irish Independence
Like other British colonies in the twentieth century, Ireland gained independence
from Britain. During Easter Week of 1916, revolutionaries in Ireland allied with Ger-
many in an attempt to expel British rule.26 Although the Easter Rising failed, it garnered
Irish hostility towards British rule.27 As Irish nationalism intensified, two organizations
emerged to counter the British power: the Irish Republican Army ("IRA") and Sinn
Fein.28 The IRA formed as a paramilitary organization to wage guerilla warfare against
advocates for Britain's presence in Ireland.29 Sinn Fein emerged from those advocating
peaceful resistance to the British presence in Ireland.3 °
C. The Formulation of Partition
The early IRA and Sinn Fein achieved their goal of independence, but only for part
of Ireland. In 1920, the British Parliament passed the Better Government of Ireland
Act,31 dividing Ireland into two provinces. The six counties in tie northern province of
Ulster contained a majority of Protestants who were loyal to Britain.32 The southern
region of Ireland was essentially nationalist and sought greater independence from Brit-
extend Anglicanism (i.e., the Church of England) to Ireland, but "[t]he native Irish remained committed to
their Catholicism and to their resistance to Crown rule."); Duncan Morrow, Church and Religion in the Ulster
Crisis, in FACETS OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 154 (Seamus Dunn ed., 1995) ("The 'reformation'
in Ireland was not, in the main, a question of the mass indigenous conversion of natives but of the influx of
large numbers of Protestants into Ireland.").
21. See Christaldi, supra note 12, at 130 (describing the Irish resentment to the English exploitation of
Irish property in the seventeenth century). In the seventeenth century, the British transferred land titles from
the Catholic Irish to the Protestant English, creating a Protestant upper class. See id. at 133 (describing the
violent and cruel policies that Oliver Cromwell, the English Civil War leader, inflicted upon Ireland). When
famine struck Ireland in 1845, the British attempt at relief proved to be inadequate; notably, "huge quantities
of food were exported from Ireland to England throughout the period when the people of Ireland were dying of
starvation." See id. at 140.
22. See id. (describing English efforts to colonize Ireland and convert its population to Anglicanism);
Hume, supra note 6, at 967 (noting that colonists who came to Northern Ireland were Protestants).
23. See Morrow, supra note 20, at 154 (describing the economic history of Ireland).
24. See Christaldi, supra note 12 at 135-37 (describing the Protestant composition of the Irish Parliament
and its effects on Ireland's Catholic population). Notably, many Irish deemed Britain's attempt at reform-the
Roman Catholic Relief Act-to be insufficient. See id. at 137 ('[P]olitical equality had been delayed too long,
granted under pressure and not as an act of justice.... It therefore failed to merit gratitude of Irish Catholics or
divert them from nationalism."' (quoting THOMAS E. HACHEY ET AL., THE IRISH EXPERIENCE 65 (1989)).
25. See id. (describing the evolution of the British position towards Roman Catholics within the United
Kingdom).
26. See id. at 143-44 (noting that the Irish revolutionaries conspired with the Germans during the World
War I to plot against England).
27. See Callanan, supra note 2, at 90 (setting forth the political history of the Irish Republic).
28. See Christaldi, supra note 12, at 147-148 (outlining the history of Sinn Fein and the IRA).
29. See id. at 148 (describing the origins of the IRA).
30. See id. at 146 (describing the origins of Sinn Fein).
31. See BARDON, supra note 17, at 477 (providing the history of the partition of Northern Ireland).
32. See Hume, supra note 6, at 968 (1994) (noting that the British partitioned Ireland to keep the North
within the United Kingdom based on its Protestant majority).
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ain.33 Consequently, the Act demarcated north from south, giving each region its own
parliament with jurisdiction limited to regional affairs, while London retained central
authority.34 Irish nationalists in the south were not satisfied and violence continued.35 In
1921, both sides declared truce and the southern region of Ireland became the Irish Free
State, giving it dominion status with minimal ties to Britain.36 In 1922, the Irish Free
State ratified a constitution that maintained limited political ties to Britain.37 In 1937 the
Constitution was rewritten to reflect complete independence. 38 Notably, the Irish Con-
stitution has continuously enshrined Catholicism as the basis for its laws.
39
D. Modern Stratification in Northern Ireland
Today, Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom, along with England,
Scotland, and Wales.4° Commonly referred to as "Ulster," it contains two factions that
seek to define its political and cultural identity: Unionist and Nationalist.
4 1
Unionists are predominantly Protestant descendants of British immigrants who came
to Ireland during British rule.42 Today, they seek to maintain Northern Ireland as part of
the United Kingdom.43 Their Protestant identity influences this outlook, as "there is
genuine apprehension that the perceived religious hegemony of the Catholic church in
the Republic of Ireland would inevitably result in the restriction of the religious freedom
of Protestants within any form of united Ireland.",4 4 Staunch Unionists, often called
"Loyalists,' 45 constitute a hard-line fringe that continues to gravitate towards violence in
the face of diplomatic efforts to bring peace to Ulster.
46
33. See Christaldi, supra note 12, at 142 (noting that nationalism flourished in the Southern region of
Ireland while the North feared the dissolution of ties with Britain).
34. See BARDON, supra note 17, at 477 (detailing the structure of political governance derived from
partition); Callanan, supra note 2, at 91 (delineating Irish history).
35. See Callanan, supra note 2, at 88 (assessing the Nationalist reaction to British power).
36. See id. at 91 (analyzing Ireland's political history).
37. See id. at 92-93 (describing the Irish Free State's constitutional history).
38. See id. at 92-93 (describing the constitutional history of the Irish Republic).
39. See id. at 94-95 (describing the ascendancy of Catholic values in the Irish Constitution).
40. See, e.g., THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA 1247 (David Crystal ed., 1990) (defining the United
Kingdom).
41. See, e.g., Angela Hegarty, Observing the Rule of Law: Experiences from Northern Ireland, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 647, 648-49 (1997) (outlining the demographics of modern-day Northern Ireland).
42. See e.g., Hume, supra note 6, at 967 (describing the distinct political and religious backgrounds
between the Protestant and Catholic residents of Northern Ireland); Dominic Murray, Culture Religion and
Violence in Northern Ireland, in FACETS OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 215 (Seamus Dunn ed.,
1995) (delineating Protestant fears of a united Ireland).
43. See, e.g., John Darby, Conflict in Northern Ireland: A Background Essay, in FACETS OF THE CONFLICT
IN NORTHERN IRELAND 15, 19-20. (Seamus Dunn ed., 1995) (outlining the main entities which influence the
affairs of Northern Ireland).
44. See Murray, supra note 42, at 216 (delineating Protestant fears of being overwhelmed by Catholicism).
See generally Hume, supra note 6, at 969-70 (noting that Northern Irish Protestants want to preserve their
heritage by excluding others); John Hume, Acceptance of Diversity: The Essence of Peace in the North of
Ireland, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1084, 1086 (developing further his analysis of the Unionist outlook);
GALLIHER & DEGREGORY, supra note 20, at 144-63 (describing the sermons of Ian Paisley, a fanatical
Loyalist parson in Northern Ireland).
45. See, e.g., Hegarty, supra note 41, at 648 (describing the nomenclature of divisions in Northern
Ireland).
46. See Karen Donfried, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE
PEACE PROCESS 6 (updated June 2, 1998) (discussing violent Loyalist splinter groups as a threat to the peace
process).
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In contrast, Nationalists are usually Catholic47 and seek to dissolve Northern Ire-
land's political ties with Britain and bring Northern Ireland into the Irish Republic.48
Historically, Catholics suffered discrimination and repression by Protestants, who con-
trolled the political and economic resources of Ulster.49 This discrimination makes Na-
tionalists unwilling to accept rule from Westminster,50 the home of the British Parlia-
ment in London. 5 1 Countering the Loyalist fringe within the Unionist camp, extreme
Nationalists, often called "Republicans, '52 have a history of resorting to violence to
achieve their political goals.53
E. The Origin and Effects of Paramilitary Activity
The tension between the Unionist and Nationalist populations of Northern Ireland
erupted into violence over three decades ago. In the late 1960s, Catholics initiated a civil
rights movement that brought civil unrest in Northern Ireland. 4 The largely Protestant
police force, known as the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), 55 was unable to quell dis-
order, causing the British government to deploy military personnel in Northern Ireland
to bolster security.56 Ironically, Ulster Catholics initially welcomed Britain's troops,
which had been deployed to protect the Catholic minority from violence by loyalist
paramilitary forces.5 7 Thus, modem paramilitary organizations developed as extremists
47. See id. (describing Ulster Nationalists).
48. See, e.g., Darby, supra note 43, at 19 ("The basic tenet of [N]ationalists is the aspiration to unify the
island of Ireland.").
49. See, e.g., DAVID MCKrrTRICK, ENDGAME: THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND 11-52
(1994) (describing the political repercussions of anti-Catholic discrimination by Protestants); Hume, supra
note 6, at 968 ("In order to maintain their position and to protect their heritage the Unionist people
discriminated against the Catholic minority in housing, jobs[,] and voting rights."). But cf., Mary Hickman,
Racism and Identity: Issues for the Irish in Britain, in CULTURE, IDENTITY AND POLITICS 26 (Terence Ranger,
et al. eds., 1996) (analyzing British prejudice against Irish Catholics); THOMAS CAHILL, HOW THE IRISH
SAVED CIVILIZATION 6 (1995) (analyzing British prejudice against the Irish and asserting that Irish monks
played significant role in preserving the writings of classical civilization during the Middle Ages in Europe).
50. See Hume, supra note 6, at 970 (asserting that Britain did nothing to help end discrimination in
Northern Ireland for most of its recent history).
51. See, e.g., THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 40, at 1295 (noting that Westminster is a
borough of London, England, the administrative center for the United Kingdom, and the location of the
Houses of Parliament). The British Parliament consists of the House of Lords and an elected House of
Commons. See id. at 909.
52. See, e.g., Hegarty, supra note 41, at 648 (describing the nomenclature of divisions in Northern
Ireland).
53. See Donfried, supra note 46, at 6 (discussing violent Republican splinter groups as a threat to the
peace process).
54. See Adrian Guelke, Paramilitary forces, Republicans and Loyalists, in FACETS OF THE CONFLICT IN
NORTHERN IRELAND 115-16 (Seamus Dunn ed., 1995) (describing the origins of sectarian violence in
Northern Ireland). See generally, BOB PURDIE, POLITICS IN THE STREETS: THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1990) (describing the political underpinnings of the civil rights
movement in Northern Ireland).
55. See, e.g., Hegarty supra note 41, at 652 (explaining that the RUC draws its membership largely from
the Protestant Community); Honore, supra note 6 ("Catholics want a new police force. They regard the present
royal Ulster Constabulary, which is 93 percent Protestant, almost as an occupying army, and accuse its
members of harassment and worse.").
56. See Guelke, supra note 54, at 116 (explaining the role of paramilitary operatives in Northern Ireland).
Notably, Guelke argues that paramilitary organizations have played only a limited role in the conflict. See id.
See generally, KEVIN TOOLIS, REBEL HEARTS (1995) (providing an extensive history of the IRA in Northern
Ireland).
57. See Hume, supra note 6, at 981-82 (describing the origins of paramilitary violence); GEULKE, supra
note 54, at 116 (noting that Catholics initially welcomed the arrival of British troops because the troops were
being sent to protect Catholics from Loyalist mobs hostile to the civil rights movement). In more recent times,
Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams has used the presence of British troops in Northern Ireland as a justification
for the activities of the IRA, arguing "it is not the Protestant people we are against, it is the British presence we
2o00
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on both sides of the conflict and began using terrorism to achieve their political goals.
58
Loyalist groups include the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer
Force (UVF).59 A number of Protestant/Loyalist political parties have been successful in
recent elections. 60 Nationalists are more cohesive, centralizing their paramilitary efforts
in the modem "Provisional" IRA61 with political leadership centralized in Sinn Fein.62
Paramilitary activity has yielded a diverse range of victims, including civilians and
children.63 Moreover, the line between a seemingly innocent bystander and a political
target is intentionally blurred in the eyes of some paramilitary forces, especially those
motivated by hatred more than politics. 64 IRA explosions have killed women and chil-
dren65 and left hundreds homeless in the war against "legitimate targets," a category that
includes any citizen in Northern Ireland who provides a good or service to Britain's
are against. And the British are here defending their own interests by force." Hume, supra note 6, at 971
(italics added) (quoting Gerry Adams).
58. See Anthony M. Gallagher, The Approach of Government: Community Relations and Equity, in
FACETS OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 27 (Seamus Dunn ed., 1995). Gallagher provides
illustrative statistics on the violence resulting from the conflict from 1972 to 1992: (1) over 3,000 people have
been killed; (2) 34,000 shootings have been recorded; (3) 1400 bombs have been planted; (4) over 100 tons of
explosives have been seized (and it is estimated that over 100 tons of explosives have been exploded); (5) over
15,000 people have been charged with terrorist offenses; (6) nearly 50% of the population has experienced the
death of a friend or acquaintance because of the conflict; (7) nearly 10% has experienced the death of a family
member. See id. As of 1994, Loyalist paramilitary forces were responsible for 30% of the death toll,
Republican groups were responsible for 60%, and the British army and the RUC were responsible for 10%.
See Hume, supra note 6, at 982 (itemizing the human cost of the Troubles). The British Army's presence in
Northern Ireland has included MI5, M16, and the SAS. See RAYMOND MURRAY, THE SAS IN IRELAND 103
(1990) (analyzing the history of British forces in Ireland). The SAS is an elite unit of the British Army; MI5 is
Britain's domestic intelligence service; M16 is Britain's overseas intelligence service. See, e.g., TOOLIS, supra
note 56, at xiv-xv (listing organizations involved in the Troubles).
59. See David McKittrick, Young Turks are blamed for rise in Loyalist Violence, INDEP., Aug. 11, 1990
reprinted in DAVID McKITTRICK, ENDGAME 137 (1994) (describing the upsurge in Loyalist terrorist activity).
McKittrick notes that Loyalist paramilitary forces have killed approximately 400 people, most of whom were
civilians. See id. David McKittrick, the Ireland Correspondent for The Independent, has written two books
which are compilations of his newspaper articles on the Troubles: (1) DAVID MCKITIRICK, ENDGAME: THE
SEARCH FOR PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1994) and (2) DAVID MCKITTRICK, DISPATCHES FROM BELFAST
(1989).
60. See, e.g., Donfried, supra note 14, at 2 (analyzing recent elections in Ulster). Donfried points out that
several political parties exist in Northern Ireland, with varying approaches to how the Troubles should be
resolved. This spectrum includes a centrist party comprised of both Catholics and Protestants. See id.
61. See Hume, supra note 6, at 968 (noting that that the modern form of the IRA is a product of the non-
violent civil rights movement and is referred to as the 'Provisional' Irish Republican Army); TOOLIS, supra
note 56, at xiv (noting that the 'Provisional IRA' is synonymous with the 'IRA'). The term 'Provisional IRA'
distinguishes the modem-day IRA from a splinter group known as the 'Official IRA,' which split from the
Provisionals in 1969 and have since played an extremely limited role in Northern Ireland. See id. Members of
the Provisional IRA are called 'Provos.' See id. at xv. See generally David McKittrick, Loyalist Killers Have
Criminal Element, INDEP., Sept. 8 1993, reprinted in David McKittrick, ENDGAME: THE SEARCH FOR PEACE
IN NORTHERN IRELAND 127 (1994) (contrasting the military ethos of the IRA with the criminal ethos of the
Loyalist paramilitary forces). The IRA thinks of itself as a genuine army. See id. Thus, Sinn Fein, the political
ally of the IRA, argues that it is mindful of the human cost of violence, while simultaneously
"acknowledg[ing] the selfless contribution which successive generations of Irish men and women have given
to their country by taking up arms in the pursuit of liberty." Sinn Fein, The Nature of the Problem, in PATHS
TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN IRELAND: POLICY PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE FORUM FOR PEACE AND
RECONCILIATION 37 (Blackstaff Press Limited 1995).
62. See, e.g., TOOLIS, supra note 56, at xv (describing Sinn Fein as the legal political wing of the IRA).
63. See Reid & Balz, supra note 5 ("Victims have ranged from retirees in wheelchairs to toddlers who
happened to be playing on the wrong sidewalk at the wrong time .. ").
64. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 67 (describing how Loyalist paramilitary activists chose to rape
three nurses because the nurses were Roman Catholics).
65. See, e.g., David McKittrick, The Scars of Violence, in ENDGAME: THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN
NORTHERN IRELAND 141 (1994) (detailing testimonials from the medical community in Northern Ireland who
had cared for injured victims).
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security forces.66 This outlook is not limited to Republicans. Loyalists convicted of rape
chose their victims because they believed the women were Catholic. 67 Thus, religious
prejudice undoubtedly influences the conflict. 68 Still, the primary divisions are said to
derive from politics, not religion.
69
F. Recent Movements Toward a Diplomatic Solution
1. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985
Against the backdrop of this human tragedy, political leaders in Britain and Ireland
have sought to bring a diplomatic resolution to the Troubles. In 1985, the Anglo-Irish
Agreement between Britain and Ireland mandated that popular consent must form the
basis for Northern Ireland's political affiliation.70 The Agreement created an intergov-
ernmental council between the two countries, thereby giving Ireland a voice in the poli-
tics of Ulster.7' More importantly, it provided a political and diplomatic mandate to
resolve the conflict.72 The Agreement was received with severe protest from the Union-
ist/Loyalist communities of Northern Ireland, which felt betrayed by the British gov-
ernment.73
2. The Downing Street Declaration of 1993
In 1993, the British Prime Minister John Major and the Irish Taoiseach74 Albert
Reynolds concluded negotiations that resulted in the Downing Street Declaration.75
66. See TOOLIS, supra note 56, at 53 (explaining that the IRA decided that anyone who provided services
or materials to security forces [such as the RUC or British troops stationed in Northern Ireland] was a viable
target for an IRA attack). According to Toolis, this includes the grocer, gas station owner, and building
contractor who profited by selling goods or services to British forces. See id.
67. See id. at 152 (remarking that Republican paramilitaries think of themselves as political prisoners but
feel this status does not apply to Loyalist paramilitary activists). One incarcerated IRA man summarizes his
views of Loyalists:
In general, I would say Republicans know what they are fighting for, Loyalists don't.
They came across as street boys, thugs with tattoos, who would attack when they were
drunk. They were not brave men, just uneducated, working-class yobs. None of them
could articulate why they were in jail.
Id.
68. See Murray, supra note 42, at 215 (stating that religion is used as a proxy for political divisions).
69. See id. ("[O]ften the conflict in Northern Ireland is presented in terms of a religious war which it
certainly is not... 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' simply provide convenient, and often misleading, labels under
which the conflict can be compartmentalized."); Reid & Balz, supra note 7 (noting that the conflict in
Northern Ireland has been primarily political, not religious, with tensions heightened by violence).
70. See Callanan, supra note 2, at 92 (analyzing the Anglo-Irish Agreement).
71. See id. (analyzing the Anglo-Irish Agreement).
72. See id. ("The Agreement can be credited for enabling more recent progress because it set in motion a
process for a constitutional solution to the ethnic conflict.").
73. See J. BOWYER BELL, THE IRISH TROUBLES 711 (1993) (describing the Unionist reaction to
Westminster's willingness to appease Ulster nationalists); Guelke, supra note 54, at 124 (affirming that
virtually the entire Protestant community was against the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, triggering civil unrest).
74. The Irish Taoiseach is the Head of Government- a Prime Minister - and is appointed by the President,
who is the Head of State. See Department of Foreign Affairs, Constitution and Government of Ireland (visited
Jun. 9, 1998) <http://www.irlgov.ie/iveaghlforeignaffairstfactscongov.htnml>.
75. Downing Street, supra note 10. Downing Street resulted from the dialogue between John Hume, co-
founder and leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, and a member of the British Parliament, and
Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein. See Hume, Acceptance of Diversity: The Essence of Peace in the North
of Ireland, supra note 44, at 1089-90 (arguing that both Republicans and Unionists in Ulster cultivate mindsets
that impede the peace process). The agreement grew out of these talks and secret discussions between the
British government and Sinn Fein. See id. (analyzing the diplomatic history of Downing Street). Various
British Governments had maintained a public position that it would not negotiate with the IRA, thus Britain
subsequently denied any negotiations with Sinn Fein. When the negotiations were exposed, it reduced the
credibility of the British government in Ireland. See David McKittrick, Troubles Cloak Long History of Secret
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Downing Street reaffirmed the commitment of both governments to consent as a basis
for political rule in Ulster.76 Furthermore, both governments expressed a strong willing-
ness to seek a resolution to the Troubles. 77 Each government made a mild but vague
retreat from its historical approach to Ulster. Ireland acknowledged the Unionist's re-
sentment of elements of the Irish Constitution without specifying which elements were
78sources of contention. Britain declared that it had "no selfish strategic or economic
interest in Northern Ireland. 7 9 Ireland seemed to be willing to revise its Constitution
(perhaps Articles 2 and 3),80 in which the Republic proclaims its sovereignty over all of
Ireland, including Ulster and its Protestant majority.81 Britain appeared willing to with-
draw from Northern Ireland altogether if these actions would lead to peace in Ulster.82
To facilitate an end to paramilitary violence, Downing Street limited access to po-
litical dialogue to parties committed to exclusively peaceful methods of political
change.8 3 This represented an invitation from the British government to Sinn Fein to sit
at the negotiating table if it dissociated itself from Republican paramilitary activity.
84
Britain later published a clarification of its position in response to Sinn Fein's request,
stating that Sinn Fein and the IRA would need to make a "public and permanent renun-
ciation of violence as a means of achieving political ends, and [a] commitment to peace-
ful and democratic means alone., 85 The IRA announced a suspension of all military
activity.8 6 Loyalist paramilitaries promptly announced they would join a temporary
Meetings, INDEP., Nov. 18, 1993, in DAVID MCKrrTRICK, ENDGAME: THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN NORTHERN
IRELAND 310 (1994) (describing Britain's history of secret negotiations with the IRA); David McKittrick,
Mayhew Stumbles, the Documents don't match, and British credibility in Ireland Reaches a New Low, INDEP.,
Dec. 5, 1993, in DAVID McKIrrRICK, ENDGAME: THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND 311 (1994)
(describing the Irish reaction to Britain's denial of negotiating with the IRA). Notably, John Hume was one of
the driving forces behind Good Friday. His efforts at bringing a lasting peace to Northern Ireland led to his
recent nomination for and acceptance of the Nobel Peace Price, which he shares with David Trible, another
political leader and peace activist. See Doug Mellgren, Irish Leaders Win Nobel Peace Prize, WASH. POST,
Oct. 16, 1998, in Irish Leaders Win Nobel Prize (visited Oct. 17, 1998) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wpsrv/inatl/longternnireland/nireland.htm.>.
76. See Downing Street, 7.
77. See id. at 2.
78. See id. at 7.
79. See id. at 4.
80. Cf, Callanan, supra note 2, at 103 (arguing that Downing Street creates the possibility of altering
articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution).
81. See id. at 96 (describing articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution).
82. See Walker & Weaver, supra note 11, at 820 ("The 1993 Declaration basically affirms British interests
to be in harmony and peace rather than in sovereignty and occupation.").
83. See Downing Street at 10 (stating that parties committed to "exclusively peaceful methods and which
have shown that they abide by the democratic process" are welcome to engage in and participate in democratic
politics). A central problem with this provision of Downing Street was that it was deemed vague by
Republican groups. See Walker & Weaver, supranote 11, at 828 (arguing that the invitation to participate in
politics if violence is renounced is one of 1993's most uncertain aspects).
84. See Donfried, supra note 14, at 1 ("The two [British and Irish] leaders held out the possibility for Sinn
Fein, the political wing of the [IRA], to participate in multiparty talks on Northern Ireland's future, if Sinn
Fein were to renounce violence.").
85. British Response to Sinn Fein Request for Clarification, available in JOHN P. DUNNIGAN, DEEP-
ROOTED CONFLICT AND THE IRA CEASE-FIRE, 83, 92 (1995) (outlining the prerequisites set forth by the
British government necessary for Sinn Fein to participate in a political dialogue on Northern Ireland). The
British Government reiterated the time frame necessary to show sufficient commitment to peace: a dialogue
could begin within three months of a commitment to peaceful change. See id. ("The reason for the time lapse
between a permanent cessation of violence and exploratory dialogue is to enable the commitment to
exclusively peaceful and democratic methods to be fully demonstrated.").
86. See Donfried, supra note 14, at 1 (outlining the diplomatic history of movements to eliminate sectarian
violence in Ulster).
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• cease-fire.87 Negotiations continued but the IRA became dissatisfied with the slow pace
of progress.8 8 As a result, paramilitary activity resumed when the IRA detonated bombs
in London in 1996.89 An IRA activist asserted "[w]e've finally got our pride back. The
bomb was long overdue. I hope there are more."90 This outlook may have led to the
decision to resume paramilitary activity; the IRA felt it was better to resume violence
than to risk alienating its hard-liners.
91
3. The Good Friday Accord of 1998
April 10, 1998 marks the most recent chapter in the quest for peace in Ulster. The
Good Friday Peace Accord endeavors to establish a framework for resolution of political
and military conflict in Northern Ireland by creating a series of political institutions
designed to address the concerns of Unionists and Loyalists in Ulster, as well as those of
the British and Irish governments.92 A majority of the residents in both Northern Ireland
and the Irish Republic recently endorsed Good Friday in popular referendums.93 Catho-
lics in both provinces overwhelmingly supported the agreement, while a significant
minority of Ulster Protestants voted against it.94 Specifically, Good Friday mandates the
following:
(1) POLITICAL TIES: Northern Ireland will retain political ties to Britain unless a
majority of the population eventually chooses a different political affiliation.
95
(2) GOVERNANCE: Now Northern Ireland is largely governed by the new Northern
Ireland Assembly, which has significant latitude to govern independently of
Westminster." The first Assembly was elected under a system of proportional repre-
87. See id. at I (noting that the IRA cease-fire of August 31, 1994, was followed by a Loyalist cease-fire
on October 13, 1994).
88. See, e.g., Suzanne Breen, Even Senior IRA Members Not Aware Bombing Was Planned, IRISH TIMES,
Feb. 15, 1996, at Home News5. (noting that IRA members believed that "[tihe British were given 18 months
to sort out this problem but did nothing;" and "[t]hey wouldn't talk to Sinn Fein, they wouldn't release the
prisoners. They were just intent on humiliating us.").
89. See Donfried, supra note 14, at 2 (explaining that the IRA ended its cease-fire on February 9, 1996
with a bomb attack on London in which two people were killed and 100 people were injured).
90. See Breen, supra note 88, at Home News5 (providing the response of typical IRA members, some of
whom were kept unaware of the plan to resume paramilitary activity).
91. See Breen, supra note 88, at Home News5 ("It might well have been only a matter of time before some
[IRA members] broke away and resumed violence independently. The hard-liners said there was a need to
strike now in order to avoid a split.").
92. See generally, Preparing for an end to Violence, IRISH POST, April 18, 1998, at 3 (summarizing the
major political power structures created by Good Friday); The Road to Peace, WASH. POST. (visited May 27,
1998) <http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatllongterm/nireland/roadtopeace.htm> (summarizing the major
political power structures created by Good Friday and providing brief biographies of political actors pertinent
to Good Friday and the peace process).
93. See Reid & Balz, supra note 7, at Al (noting that the Good Friday vote had the highest voter turnout
ever in Northern Ireland). Reid and Balz also provide statistics on Good Friday's approval by jurisdiction: in
Northern Ireland, 71.1% (676,966 voters) voted for Good Friday, while 28.9% (274,879 voters) voted against
it. In the Republican of Ireland, 94.4% (1,442,583) voted for Good Friday, while 5.6% (85,748) voted against
it. See id. (noting that Good Friday's high approval "suggests that the plan won majority support across the
community - from Protestants as well as Catholics.").
94. See T.R. Reid and Dan Balz, Pact Approved, Northern Ireland Turns to Picking Assembly, WASH.
POST, May 25, 1998, at A24 (noting that exit polling revealed that Catholics favored Good Friday by a margin
of 96 to 4, while Protestants favored Good Friday by a margin of 55 to 45).
95. See Good Friday, supra note 4, Annex A l.(1) (providing draft legislation for Britain mandating that
Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom unless voters choose otherwise).
96. See Good Friday, supra note 4, Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland (outlining the
structure the Northern Ireland Assembly); Preparing for an end to Violence, supra note 92, at 3 ("The
Assembly will have legislative and executive powers in six areas: financial affairs, economic development,
education, health and social services, environment, and agriculture. Control over policing and justice may be
included in the future."). The British Parliament at Westminster will retain power to legislate for non-devolved
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sentation. 97 This system is advantageous for small parties 98 and facilitates a balance of
power between Catholics and Protestants.9
(3) INTER-IRISH RELATIONS: A North-South Ministerial Council will be created,
which will provide a forum for ministers from the Republic of Ireland to facilitate
joint policy-making with the Northern Ireland Assembly.l10
(4) BRITISH-IRISH RELATIONS: A British-Irish Council will be created, whereby
representatives from the Republic of Ireland, Britain, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and
Wales will meet regularly. 01 Although this will allow council members to discuss
matters of common concern, the British-Irish Council will have no legislative
authority. 102
(5) IRISH CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: Resulting from the popular referendum
endorsing Good Friday, the Irish Republic has amended Articles 2 and 3 of its
Constitution, thereby relinquishing its territorial claim to Northern Ireland.1
0 3
(6) PARAMILITARY DECOMMISSIONING: Incarcerated terrorists (both Republican
and Loyalist) will be released over the next two years. 1' 4 Paramilitary forces will be
decommissioned. 1
05
issues. See Good Friday, Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, 33 (outlining the scope of
British power in Northern Ireland).
97. See Shailagh Murray, Politics and Policy: Northern Ireland's Election Produces Pro-Peace Assembly,
Splits Protestants, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL-WSJE 12725817 (noting that the
elections produced an Assembly which is in favor of the peace process but contains a sizable minority of anti-
Good Friday Assembly members). Specifically, "opponents of the agreement came up two seats shy of the 30
needed to obstruct assembly business." Id.; see also infra note 99 (analyzing the new Assembly).
98. See id. ("Under the election's proportional-representation system, voters marked candidates in order of
choice, and as leaders were declared, their excess votes were distributed to others on the same ballot according
to voter preference, helping smaller parties gain seats.").
99. See Ray Moseley, Ulster Peace Factions Hail Vote as Setback for Hawks but Opposition Claims it has
Blocking Power, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 1998, at Sec. 1, p. 6. available in 1998 WL 2871108 ("The Assembly
will be set up under rules that will prevent the dominant Protestants form having things all their own way. The
rules require that measures can be adopted only with the approval of a majority of Protestant delegates and a
majority of Catholic delegates."). The first round of elections took place on June 25, 1998. Pro-Good Friday
party candidates, from Catholic and Protestant parties, won 80 seats. See id. (summarizing election results).
However, 28 anti-Good Friday Unionists were also elected. See Vanora Bennett, New N. Ireland Assembly
Chooses Protestant Leader, LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 2, 1998 at A4 (noting that these "28 Protestants will
form a die-hard anti-accord voice against proposals for relations with the Irish Republic."). Anti-Good Friday
Unionists have a strong voice in the Reverend Ian Paisley and his Democratic Unionist Party, who may seek to
block any attempts by the Assembly that they feel will "lead us closer to the Republic of Ireland." Ray
Mosley, Ulster Peace Factions Hail Vote as Setback for Hawks but Opposition Claims it has Blocking Power,
CHI. TRIB., June 28, 1998, at Sec. 1, p. 6, available in 1998 WL 2871108 (noting that Paisley's Democratic
Unionist Party placed third in the Assembly elections). Such a policy could threaten the Good Friday peace
process. Real power will shift from the British Parliament to the Northern Irish Assembly only if the Assembly
establishes "several cross-border bodies with the Irish Republic." See Vanora Bennett, New N. Ireland
Assembly Chooses Protestant Leader,.LOS ANGELES TMES, July 2, 1998 at A4 (noting that pro-Good Friday
moderates have been elected to the two top positions in the new Assembly: David Trimble, a Protestant, was
elected First Minister, while Seamus Mallon, a Catholic, was elected Deputy First Minister); infra note 100
and accompanying text (noting that Northern Irish Ministers must participate in the North-South Council).
100. See Good Friday, supra note 4, Strand Two, (2) (noting that participation in the Council is a required
responsibility of Ministers in the administrations of the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland).
101. See Good Friday, supra note 4, Strand Three (2) (describing membership for the British-Irish Council).
102. See Good Friday, supra note 4, Strand Three (6) (noting that individual members of the British-Irish
Council may choose not to participate in common policies); The Road to Peace, supra note 92 (describing the
three new political structures created by Good Friday).
103. See Good Friday, supra note 4, Constitutional Issues, Annex B, (providing the text of the amendments
to the Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution). Under the amendments: (1) "it is the entitlement and
birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland ... to be part of the Irish nation;" and (2) "a united
Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people...in both
jurisdictions." See id.; supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (noting that the unammended Articles 2 and 3
of the Irish Constitution made a territorial claim to sovereignty over all of Ireland).
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(7) CIVIL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS: Both the British and Irish Governments will
initiate efforts to bolster civil and human rights.'06 Current standards of policing and
justice will be reviewed. 10 7 In addition, Britain will implement policies designed to
enhance economic prosperity within Northern Ireland, including policies to end
discrimination and alleviate economic disparity.
08
III. The Viability of Good Friday
A. Good Friday's Efficacy
Good Friday represents a major step towards facilitating peace in Northern Ireland,
but several obstacles have a potential to thwart any sustainable manifestation of peace
and justice. 0 9 This section describes these systemic obstacles; Part IV will address the
way these obstacles impact justice by evaluating the Sentences Act.
B. The Problem of Vagueness and Splintering
Good Friday contains one of the major flaws that plagued Downing Street: it is
vaguely worded on some of the most contentious issues that stand in the way of recon-
ciling the Loyalist and Republican populations." 0 More importantly, these ambiguities
can trigger disputes over implementation which lead paramilitary organizations to
splinter into factions - with some factions willing to renounce violence, while other
factions continue armed struggle in an effort to achieve their political objectives."' Ul-
timately, Good Friday must be judged by whether it ends sectarian violence in Ulster.
Against this backdrop, Good Friday contains two provisions that may undermine the
peace process: (1) the decommissioning of paramilitary organizations," t2 and (2) the
release of paramilitary prisoners incarcerated for sectarian violence." 
3
104. See Good Friday, supra note 4, Prisoners (2) (noting that only prisoners affiliated to organizations
maintaining a cease-fire will benefit from early release).
105. See Good Friday, supra note 4, Decommissioning (noting that paramilitary forces will be disarmed
under procedures to be set forth by an Independent International Commission on Decommissioning); see infra
text Part III: Viability (asserting that the vagueness of this provision may be an obstacle to the peace process).
106. See Good Friday, supra note 4, Rights Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity (describing (1) the
intentions of the British Government to obligate public agencies to promote equality of opportunity in relation
to religion and political opinion; (2) the plan to create a new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission; and
(3) the intention of the Irish Government to strengthen human rights and employment equality).
107. See Good Friday, supra note 4, Policing and Justice (noting that an independent Commission will
recommend changes to current policing arrangements to achieve widespread community support).
108. See Good Friday, supra note 4, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Economic, Social and
Cultural Issues, 1 (describing Britain's intention to pursue policies of "sustained economic growth and
stability in Northern Ireland and for promoting social inclusion .. "); see Good Friday, supra note 4, Rights,
Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Economic, Social and Cultural Issues, 2 (iii) (describing Britain's
intention to strengthen anti-discrimination legislation).
109. Cf Northern Ireland: Ballot boxes and Armalites, ECONOMIST, June 20, 1998, at 66, available in WL
11698729 (commenting that the referendum endorsing Good Friday furthered the peace process but that
crucial steps remain to be taken, especially on the decommissioning of paramilitary organizations and the
release of prisoners).
110. See Reid & Balz, supra note 7 (noting that Good Friday's vagueness creates the potential for conflict
as different political actors seek to resolve contentious issues).
111. See Donfried, supra note 46, at 6 ("The major paramilitary groups...are observing cease-fires, but
splinter groups continue to carry out acts of violence.").
112. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (describing decommissioning).
113. See Good Friday, supra note 4, Prisoners (describing paramilitary prisoner release).
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C. The Decommissioning of Paramilitary Organizations
Good Friday mandates that paramilitary organizations are to be disarmed within two
years of the referendums endorsing the agreement."i 4 The decommissioning of para-
military organizations will take place under the guidance of the Independent Interna-
tional Commission on Decommissioning and the British and Irish Governments." 5 In
addition, members of the Northern Ireland Assembly can be removed from office for
failing to live up to a pledge to show "commitment to non-violence and exclusively




Decommissioning poses two problems for the peace process: First, there are no clear
standards for how decommissioning is to be conducted or evaluated.1 7 Since any system
of disarmament entails some reliance on good-faith compliance by paramilitary organi-
zations, there is no way to ensure that paramilitary organizations will turn in all their
weapons. l 8 If a paramilitary organization splinters, some members may comply with
decommissioning, while others secretly maintain their weapons"19
Second, paramilitary splintering poses special problems to political actors. If a
commitment to peace is a prerequisite to office, candidates can distance their political
parties from sectarian violence, while splinter groups continue to wage violence - with
or without the open support of politicians who share their beliefs. 120 In addition, splin-
tering opens the possibility that a politician committed to peaceful change may still be
supported by paramilitary activists.
12 1
114. See Good Friday, supra note 4, Decommissioning.
115. See id. Canadian Air Force Officer John de Chastelain manages the International Commission. See
IRA Political Wing Says Decommissioning Arms "Dead-End Issue, " AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 25,
1998, available in 1998 WL 2288625 (describing Sinn Fein's initial rejection of attempts to reconstruct the
decommissioning provisions of Good Friday, asserting that decommissioning "is not the issue. The issue is the
document that we voted for on Friday. Let's not be pursuing dead-end issues." Id.); U.K Govt. Welcomes
Signals of IRA Decommissioning, (visited July 20, 1998) <http://www.yahoo.co.uk/headlines/980716/news/90
0617640-0000013199.html> (noting that de Chastelain doubted that decommissioning procedures would be
initiated in the summer of 1998).
116. See Good Friday, Stand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland (describing the requirements
for the Northern Ireland Assembly).
117. See Editorial, Disarming in Northern Ireland, WASH. POST, May 31, 1998, at 66, available in 1998
WL 11583471 (noting that no conditions or qualifications were inserted into the Good Friday provision to
decommission paramilitary units to avoid weakening the mandate for peace).
118. See e.g., Martin Fletcher and Nicholas Watt, Unionists Welcome IRA Move on Arms, LON. TtMES,
June 18, 1998, at 25, available in 1998 WL 4840880 (noting that a high-ranking IRA prisoner believes
"'voluntary' de-commissioning would be a natural development of the peace process once [the IRA has] a
sense that the arrangements envisaged in the agreement are beginning to function." Id.). For a discussion of the
problems stemming from reliance on good-faith decommissioning efforts, see "IRA 'Ready to Hand Over
Weapons, "' available in 1998 WL 2321941 (stating that "The [British] [G]overnment sources conceded that
the handover would raise questions about what proportion of the IRA's arsenal it represented. But [it]
maintained that the important thing was that a gesture was made. We all know [the IRA] could hand over
equipment and buy more the next day. But what is important is the symbolism of the action[.]").
119. See "IRA 'Ready to Hand Over Weapons,"' available in 1998 WL 2321941 (noting that Unionist
distrust of Republican decommissioning has split Unionists into separate camps, some of whom would refrain
from decommissioning as a result of their distrust).
120. For example, the Reverend Ian Paisley is a fierce Loyalist - and also a current Member of the
Westminster Parliament. He has openly supported paramilitary violence by Loyalists against Republicans,
frequently using his analysis of Protestant theology as a justification. It seems illogical to presume he would
choose either (1) to remove himself from political power by refraining to represent his district in the Northern
Ireland Assembly,'or (2) To adopt a tolerant attitude toward a movement he has made a career of hating. See,
e.g, GALLIHER & L. DEGREGORY, supra note 20 (analyzing Paisley's fanaticism).
121. Concededly, this can be immaterial to the obtainment of peace in Ulster. Which candidate a terrorist
supports for the Assembly is not dispositive of whether the terrorist continues to engage in criminal acts. But
the central point remains that - secretly - a terrorist may have a sympathetic ally in the Assembly.
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D. The Release of Paramilitary Prisoners
Good Friday requires that both British and Irish governments implement procedures
to release prisoners incarcerated for acts of sectarian violence. 22 Within two years, each
government will release prisoners affiliated with organizations that are maintaining a
"complete and unequivocal cease-fire."1 23
Unionists are concerned that IRA prisoners will be released before the IRA decom-
missions its weapons. 124 Although the IRA recently announced a willingness to give up
its weapons as a gesture of support for the peace process, there remains no way to en-
sure that all weapons are surrendered. 125 In addition, splintering continues to pose a
systemic-level obstacle to peace: splinter factions of paramilitary organizations may try
to maintain weapons, thereby allowing for only a partial decommission of the organiza-
tion's total arsenal.
126
The problems of decommissioning and prisoner release are exacerbated by the fact
that Good Friday demands that the two issues cannot be linked in a diplomatic quid pro
127quo.
IV. Prisoner Release and Justice under Good Friday
A. The Northern Ireland Sentences Act
The British Government enacted the Sentences Act pursuant to its obligations under
Good Friday. 128 Under the Act, "approximately four out of every five [paramilitary]
prisoners who are currently serving sentences for [paramilitary] offenses will be released
within two years[.]' 29 About half of these prisoners would have been released within a
two-year time frame regardless of the Act.' 30 Labour Party members passed the Act after
122. See Good Friday, Decommissioning.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., "IRA 'Ready to Hand Over Weapons,"' supra note 119 (describing Unionist mistrust of the
IRA). Several incidents of paramilitary activity have occurred after Good Friday and its referendums, targeting
both Republicans and Loyalists. This suggests that both Loyalists and Republicans may have cause for
concern. See also John Mullen, Ulster Crisis:More Troops Sent In, LON. GUARDIAN, July 9, 1998, available in
1998 WL 3097684 (noting that Britain had to deploy 800 additional Royal Army troops to Northern Ireland in
order to quell Loyalist paramilitary violence in July of 1998).
125. See "IRA Ready to Hand Over Weapons, supra note 119 (noting that the IRA has easy access to
weapons). If the IRA has easy access to weapons, it follows that at least some members would likely be able to
obtain new weapons if they splintered from another portion of the IRA that sought to adhere to a cease-fire.
126. See id.
127. Conservatives in the Westminster Parliament were unsuccessful in their attempt to explicitly link the
early release of paramilitary prisoners to decommissioning. See, e.g., Frank Millar, Prisoner Release Order
Carries Comfortably, IRISH TIMES, Jul. 30, 1998, at 6 ("The [G]overnment victory came after a markedly
bitter debate which heard a succession of Conservative and Unionist MPs condemn [the British Secretary for
Northern Ireland's] decision to proceed with the early-release scheme, in light of accumulating evidence of
IRA involvement in.. murder."). Notably, however, Britain also passed legislation that makes it easier for the
Government to convict terrorists. See Polly Newton, New Bill Will Deal with "Evil Men who Seek to Wreck
Peace," LONDON TIMEs, Sept. 3, 1998, at 11 (noting that the Blair Government strongly endorsed the
legislation). Prime Minister Blair said:
The aim of the [Omagh] bombers was not just to kill innocent people but was to
strike at the heart of the peace process. The best response we can give is not therefore
to abandon the Good Friday agreement but to carry it forward vigorously, to deny
them the very objective they seek, and to continue to work for a better future for
Northern Ireland that puts the past behind it.
Id. For a discussion of the Omagh bombing, see infra note 139 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Millar, supra note 127, at 6 (describing Westminster's passage of the Act).
129. Hansard, 29 Jun. 1998: Column 446, (visited Jul. 24, 1998) <http:///www.parliament.thestatione...




suppressing an attack by Conservative and Unionist Members of Parliament ("MPs"),
who sought to make prisoner release expressly contingent upon decommissioning.'
31
Unionist dissent was summarized by one MP who speculated "'[it is beginning to look
as if the [Blair] [G]overnment is prepared to do anything Sinn Fein demands."1
32
The Sentences Act attempts to prevent violent paramilitary prisoners from receiving
the benefits of early release. Any prerequisites for release mandate that any prisoner
benefiting from the Act must: (1) have committed his offense before the announcement
of Good Friday on April 10, 1998;133 (2) not support terrorism;134 (3) be unlikely to sup-
port a terrorist organization upon early release;'
35 (4) not be a danger to the public; 1
36
and (5) must not be affiliated with any organization that is not "maintaining a complete
and unequivocal cease-fire."' 37 In addition, the Act allows the Government to consider
whether the paramilitary prisoner's sponsoring organization is in compliance with any
on-going decommissioning procedures (it may be useful to recall that Good Friday
mandates that paramilitary decommissioning is designed to be a process that takes place
under an international commission). 38 However, there are no objective criteria to link
prisoner release with decommissioning.
Paramilitary violence has not ended in Northern Ireland. On August 15, 1998 (seven
weeks after Good Friday was endorsed by popular referendum) disgruntled Republicans
detonated a bomb in county Omagh, which resulted in "by far the worst casualties of
any single bomb attack in [Ulster]., 139 The bomb was detonated by a paramilitary
splinter group - the "Real IRA.' 140 Paramilitary splinter factions, such as the "Real
IRA," reject the cease-fire and continue "the slaughter of civilians.. .to place all dissident
groups outside the terms of the peace process and to ensure a continuation of the armed
struggle."' 141 To hard-liners, old loyalties die slowly, even in the face of peace. One Na-
tionalist remarked "'look... [the bombers] are bastards, worse than that, much worse, but
they're our bastards.""1
42
131. See Millar, supra note 127, at 6. When the House of Commons were considering the Sentences Act for
final approval, the MPs supported or rejected the Act mindful of the fact that there was no link to
decommissioning, and attempts to link the two issues were ultimately rejected. See Draft Northern Ireland
Arms Decommissioning Act 1997 (Amnesty Period) Order 1998 (visited Jul. 24, 1998) <http://www.
parliament.the-statione...stand/deleg2/st98031 IsOl.htm> ("[D]ecomissioning... is a voluntary exercise. The
Government have [sic] always recognised that. It is not in the Government's gift to say when
decommissioning will occur, but occur it must." (quoting Mr. Adam Ingram, Minister of State, Northern
Ireland Office)).
132. See Millar, supra note 127, at 6. The Blair Government had been facing criticism from Unionist and
Conservative critics from the moment Good Friday was announced on April 10, 1998. To bolster public
support for Good Friday in the referendum, Blair had offered pledges that prisoners would only be released if
violence was "given up for good." Id. See T.R. Reid & Dan Balz, Blair Woos N. Ireland Protestants, WASH.
POST, May 21, 1998, at A39 (noting that Blair campaigned for the Good Friday in Northern Ireland by
offering five handwritten pledges which were enlarged and displayed as posters reading "Prisoner[s] kept in
unless violence is given up for good." ).
133. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, 1998 (U.K.), sec. 7(7)(a).
134. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, 1998 (U.K.), sec. 3(4).
135. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, 1998 (U.K.), sec. 3(5).
136. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, 1998 (U.K.), sec. 3(6).
137. Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, 1998 (U.K.), sec. (8)(a).
138. See supra notes 105 and 115 (analyzing Good Friday and decommissioning as a process towards
achieving peace).
139. The Omagh Bombing, IRISH TMES, Aug. 17, 1998, at 9, available in 1998 WL 13616578 (delineating
the history of Ulster's bloodiest bomb attacks).
140. Id. at 11, available in 1998 WL 13616589 (analyzing the formation of factions within the IRA).
141. Id.
142. Dick Walsh, Opinion, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 29, 1998, at 14, available in 1998 WL 13618627 (criticizing
as counterproductive'the hawkish backlash of Unionist politicians against the reemergence of sectarian
violence).
[Vol. 26:163
The Good Friday Peace Accord
Good Friday achieved popular support for the same reason the Sentences Act passed
- paramilitary prisoner release was seen as a necessary step in the peace process. 143 The
Omagh bombing suggests that Ulster's population is enduring the burden of peace -
early prisoner release - yet peace is not at hand. In light of this development, it seems
fair to address whether the citizenry of Northern Ireland receives justice under the Sen-
tences Act.
B. The Utilitarian and Kantian Paradigms of Justice
Two distinct jurisprudential approaches to criminal law create useful lenses through
which "justice" can be evaluated: (1) the Utilitarian paradigm and (2) the Kantian para-
digm.
1. The Utilitarian Paradigm of Justice
The Utilitarian paradigm of justice predicates the state's right to punish the criminal
on the social benefit gained by the deterring effect that punishment has on criminal ac-
tivity.14 In practical terms, a system of criminal punishment creates three social bene-
fits: (1) the threat of punishment can deter the potential criminal from malignant acts;
(2) the administration of punishment can rehabilitate the criminal, either by teaching
him his act was wrong, or by forcing him to recognize that his misdeeds entail the loss
of his liberty; and (3) the incarceration of the criminal prevents him from participating in
criminal behavior during the duration of his confinement.
145
This deterrence rationale solidifies the notion that criminal punishments are a serv-
ice to the state itself. As Professor H.L.A. Hart notes:
[T]he moral justification for punishment lies in its effects-in its contribution to the
prevention of crime and the social readjustment of the criminal. It is essentially for-
ward-looking: it considers the future good we can do to society including the crimi-
143. Prisoner release was the bitter pill swallowed by the British Lords who felt a mandate to protect British
subjects from crime. The legislative history of the Sentences Act reveals as much:
I know that many noble Lords are uncomfortable with this legislation. I share that
discomfort... .Many people in Northern Ireland and Great Britain have suffered greatly
at the hands of the terrorists, including some noble Lords who are here today. The
security forces who have pursued the terrorists with vigour have also paid a high price
over the years, in many cases with their lives. People have said that those who have
committed such terrible crimes should not receive any special consideration at this
time. I acknowledge and have sympathy for that sentiment, but it cannot be allowed to
determine the issue. The release of prisoners is part of the price to be paid for long-
term peace in Northern Ireland. That prisoners would be part of the settlement was
recognised in the negotiations that led to the conclusion of the Good Friday
Agreement.
Draft Appropriation (No. 2) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (visited Jul. 24, 1998) <http://www.parliament.
thestatione...stand/nirelg/st980702/ 80702s01 .htm> (quoting Lord Dubs) (emphasis added).
144. See Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 11
(1985) (analyzing various philosophical theories of criminal punishment). According to Benn's analysis of
utilitarianism, "[p]unishment is only an unfortunate consequence of the fact that...threats, which are the true
operative elements in the system, are partially ineffective and would be wholly ineffective if they were not
carried out when they failed to deter." Id. at 14.
145. See RICHARD B. BRANDT, The Utilitarian Theory of Criminal Punishment, in READINGS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 315, 316 (John Arthur & William H. Shaw eds., 1993) (analyzing the traditional
utilitarian theory of criminal law). See also JEREMEY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES AND
MORALS OF LEGISLATION 11-16 (J.H. Bums and H.L.A. Hart, eds. 1970) (1789) (providing a philosophical
basis for the principle of happiness). The principle of happiness, also referred to as the principle of utility, can
be summarized as "the greatest good of the greatest number." See, e.g., SAMUEL STUMPF, PHILOSOPHY:
HISTORY & PROBLEMS 335 (1983) (analyzing utilitarian philosophy in political and legal domains).
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nal.... So, if what we do to him is to advance any rational social purpose, we must
understand his crime; but it cannot by itself dictate the kind or severity of punish-
ment. 146
Thus, punishment is justified by deterrence. As a logical consequence it follows that it
can be just to forgo or commute the criminal's punishment when either (1) punishment
will not provide a deterrent to criminal activity, or (2) the utility of deterring future
crime is outweighed by another more compelling social gain. In either case, the normal
imposition of criminal sanctions is nullified by the invalidation of its presumed conse-
quence: an increase in social utility.
From a societal perspective, the Utilitarian paradigm's primary value is that it pri-
oritizes social utility, with criminal punishment following as a means to this end. Struc-
turally, this would seem to maximize social welfare.
2. The Kantian Paradigm of Justice
In contrast to the utilitarian approach, Immanuel Kant presented a theory of criminal
punishment predicated on the "metaphysical" elements of justice, independent of any
utilitarian rationale. 147 Frequently referred to as a "retributivist,'' 48 this approach count-
ers the utilitarian rationale: criminal punishment exists to "guarantee that criminals will
get their just deserts, even in cases where this would be clearly disutilitarian."' 149 As
146. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONsIBILrry 159-60 (1968) (presenting a positivist and utilitarian
to criminal punishment).
147. "Metaphysics" can be an ambiguous term. Two definitions may help clarify its meaning.
"Metaphysics" can be defined as the branch of philosophy that examines the nature of reality and the
relationship between mind and matter. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1134 (3d ed. 1996). It can also
be defined as the branch of philosophy concerned with the question of the ultimate nature of reality... going:
beyond particular things to inquire about more general questions such as what lies
beyond nature, how things come into being, what it means for something to be, and
whether there is a realm of being which is not subject to change and which is therefore
the basis of certainty in knowledge.
STUMPF, supra note 145, at G-3 (1983)..
Kant entitles one of his pieces "The Metaphysical Elements of Justice," which conveys that he seeks to
discern the elements of justice as they exist in a manifestation of reality outside of human experience. For a
normative explanation of "metaphysics" from a primary source, see IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON 54-55 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., Macmillan & Co. St. Martin's Press Inc. 1933) (1781). In his
work, Kant states:
[E]ven if we look upon [metaphysics] as having hitherto failed in all its endeavours,
[it] is yet, owing to the nature of human reason, a quite indispensable science, and
ought to contain a priori synthetic knowledge. For its business is not merely to analyse
concepts which we make for ourselves a priori of things, and thereby to clarify them
analytically, but to extend our a priori knowledge. And for this purpose we must
employ principles which add to the given concept something that was not contained in
it, and through a priori synthetic judgments venture out so far that experience is quite
unable to follow us, as for instance, in the proposition, that the world must have a first
beginning, and such like. Thus metaphysics consists, at least in intention, entirely of a
priori synthetic propositions.
Id. See also, Stumpf, supra note 145, at 294-95 (describing Kant's analysis of judgments as Synthetic a Priori,
meaning judgements in which the "predicate is not contained in the subject," (synthetic) and in which meaning
is not dependent upon "experience of any particular cases or events since they are independent of any
observations." (a priori)). Kant's quandary was to determine how a judgment can rely on external predicates
and simultaneously have meaning independent of specific cases. He reconciled this paradox by hypothesizing
that "objects... conform to the operation of the mind, not the other way around." Id. at 297.
148. JEFFRIE MURPHY AND JULES COLEMAN, Crime and Punishment, in LAW AND JUSTICE 472,
483 ( Dale A. Nance ed., 1994) (contrasting the utilitarian and Kantian approaches to criminal justice).
149. Id. at 486. The fact that Kant's retributivist approach posits that criminal punishment is justified on
grounds independent of any social utility also leads to the conclusion that criminal punishment can (and must)
exist even when the pursuit of social utility is suspended:
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Kant asserts:
Judicial punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote some other
good for the criminal himself or for society, but instead it must in all cases be im-
posed on a person solely on the ground that he has committed a crime; for a human
being can never be confused with the objects of the law of things...he must first be
found to be deserving of punishment before any consideration can be given to the
utility of this punishment for himself or his fellow citizens. 1
It is important to emphasize that this approach is not vindictive.'' Rather, it is a
manifestation of reverence to law. Notably, Kant argues that the concept of "law," and
presumably reverence to it, is good in and of itself.' 52 The criminal's punishment can be
justified even to the criminal, if he is rational, since his punishment comports with the
law, a pre-eminent good, rather than with any less compelling social gain of deter-
rence. 1
5 3
C. Jurisprudential Analysis of the Act
Thus far, the Sentences Act has failed to achieve justice under either the Utilitarian
or the Kantian paradigms. This assessment must be qualified by the fact that the Utili-
tarian paradigm allows for the possible validation of the Sentences Act. Specifically, the
Utilitarian paradigm suggests an on-going calculation of net social utility. 1 4 Conse-
Even if civil society were to dissolve itself by common agreement of all its members
(for example, if the people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse
themselves around the world), the last murderer remaining in prison must be executed,
so that everyone will duly receive what his actions are worth and so that the blood
guilt thereof will not be fixed on the people because they failed to insist on carrying
out the punishment; for if they fail to do so, they may be regarded as accomplices in
this public violation of legal justice.
Id. at 483 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, trans. John
Ladd (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill 1965), 99-106.
150. J.G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 75 (1979) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE).
151. See Murphy and Coleman, supra note 148, at 483.
152. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 69 (H.J. Paton trans.,
Barnes & Nobles, Inc. 1963) ("[N]othing but the idea of the law in itself.., can constitute that pre-eminent
good which we call moral[.I").
153. One interpretation of the Kantian paradigm is that it does not seek to justify punishment in the same
way the Utilitarian paradigm does. Instead, it sets forth an explanation of punishment as a good in and of itself.
Consequently, it denies that punishment needs a justification. See Benn, supra note 144, at 10 (analyzing
retributivist theories of punishment). Of course, this does not preclude Kantian arguments emphasizing the
benefits of retributivism. The Kantian can argue that retributivism facilitates moral rehabilitation:
Because it was associated with shame and rejection, punishment could bring the
criminal up short and force him to reconsider his life in the light of society's
condemnation of his actions. But the remorse which was a necessary condition for
self-reformation was entirely dependent on the criminal's recognition that his
punishment was deserved. Without that there could be no inward reformation, no
reassertion of moral standards, but only a sense of resentment and injustice.
Accordingly, punishment can yield the benefits of reform only if it is thought of.
as retributive.
Benn, supra note 144, at 19.
It follows that the Kantian paradigm presumes the punished criminal must be deemed guilty of the
crime for which he is punished. The guilt requirement is not a prerequisite to the Utilitarian paradigm, in that
society may enjoy a social gain of reduced crime by punishing the innocent along with guilty, to bolster the
harshness of criminal justice and thereby bolster its deterrent effect. See Murphy and Coleman, supra note
148, at 484-85 (analyzing the guilt requirement under the Kantian paradigm).
154. The fact that utilitarianism suggests a continuing calculation of the social utility is derived from the
fact that criminal punishment stems from utilitarianism's "forward-looking" outlook. There are a series of
litmus tests the Utilitarian must ask in evaluating the efficacy of government-induced punishment:
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quently, if Ulster eventually reaches a point when it collectively gains more utility (in
the form of peace) than it loses (in the form of lost deterrence to paramilitary activists)
the Sentences Act is validated.155 In light of the attack on Omagh, this validation may be
distant and overly optimistic in the short term; the long-term consequences remain to be
seen.
Under a Kantian paradigm, two problems stem from the Sentences Act. First, the
Sentences Act releases paramilitary criminals pursuant to the democratic will. As such,
it is a prima facie violation of Kant's premise that "justice" has a metaphysical con-
struction that exists independently of anything as decidedly synthetic and non-
metaphysical as the democratic will.
Second, the Kantian, still smarting from the fact that his construction of metaphysi-
cal justice has been rejected, must now also accept two bitter pills: (1) the paramilitary
criminal escapes his 'just deserts' because society decides this is a necessary price to
pay to achieve the anti-Kantian goal of enhancing social utility by, let us say, ending
paramilitary violence and bringing peace to Ulster,156 and (2) after Omagh, it is evident
that the paramilitary criminal's release fails to achieve the proffered anti-Kantian goal of
enhancing social utility in Ulster by ending paramilitary activity. Sadly, the Kantian
proves his case by emphasizing the fact that Omagh was one of the worst manifestations
of sectarian violence in the modem history of the Troubles. Ulsterians, riving in the
aftershock, can hardly be deemed to be enjoying an enhanced social utility of peace.
157
From the Utilitarian paradigm, two problems stem from the Sentences Act. First, the
Sentences Act undermines the deterrent effect of criminal punishment.' 5 8 The would-be
paramilitary criminal can now look to the fact that incarcerated criminals, through their
political allies at the diplomatic bargaining table, are able to escape full liability under
the criminal legal system. Although the Sentences Act does not apply to paramilitary
activists who commit their offense after April 10, 1998, the paramilitary actors who
committed their offense(s) before this date have escaped full criminal liability because
citizens decided that early prisoner release was a fair price to pay to end sectarian vio-
Will punishing this person bring about more good than bad consequences for society
as a whole? That is will it deter, incapacitate, or reform? If so, will this result in
benefits sufficient to outweigh the misery that punishment will cause? If the answer is
no, then we should not punish even if, in some obscure sense, the criminal "deserves"
it; for this would be productive of no useful consequences.
MURPHY, Introduction, supra note 144, at 7.
155. The Irish Republic's Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Bertie Ahem expressed this sentiment insofar as he
envisioned that Good Friday would be a catalyst that would convince paramilitary activists to turn to peaceful
means of political change. See Robert P. Connolly, Ireland Here & There, BOSTON HERALD, May 24, 1998,
at 2, available in 1998 WL 7346201 (expressing the pre-referendum support for Good Friday).
156. As one British Lord noted during the legislative deliberations on the Sentences Act, "[w]e cannot will
the ends of the Good Friday Agreement without willing the means .... We cannot have the agreement without
[the Sentences Act]." Hansard, supra note 129 (quoting Lord Holme of Cheltenham).
157. The Kantian viewpoint was reflected in the attitude of the Conservative MPs who voted against the
Act while it was being debated in the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Conservatives felt that the
Act thwarted justice and did little to enhance a long-term end to sectarian strife:
I oppose this Bill for the violence it does to the concept of justice. This Bill gives
special treatment to political criminals. I speak for the victims of these criminals who
have shown no repentance, no contrition. The victims of the past would not wish to
stand in the way if it will mean that there will be no more victims. But there can be no
lasting peace without justice.
James Landale, Tebbit in Attack on 'Victory for Bullet,' LONDON TIMES, Jun. 30, 1998, at 8, available in 1998
WL 4844987 (quoting Lord Tebbit).
158. This is a weighty problem for the Utilitarian, since "deterrence has always been the mainstay of the
utilitarian position," even beyond other social goals of either incapacitating or reforming criminals. See
Murphy and Coleman, supra note 148, at 481 (analyzing deterrence as an asset of the Utilitarian paradigm).
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lence. Thus, the would-be paramilitary criminal now recognizes that as long as para-
military violence continues, paramilitary activists will always have a bargaining chip
that they can present to a society that craves peace: Free my comrades and I'll cease
violence. 159 This reduces the deterrent effect of incarcerating paramilitary activists.
60
Second, Ulster has not gained more utility than it had before abandoning deterrence.
Omagh suggests that Ulster has paid the price for peace - it has taken the difficult but
necessary step of reconciling incarcerated paramilitary prisoners - without gaining even
a small reduction in its level of paramilitary violence. The Sentencing Act appears to
beguile constructions of utilitarian and Kantian justice. While there appears to be no
way to reconcile the Sentencing Act with the Kantian paradigm, the Utilitarian para-
digm's focus on deterrence or other forms of social utility allows for the possibility of
utilitarian justice.
The Sentencing Act's nullification of utilitbianism's criminal deterrence may be
salvaged by the societal rejection of paramilitary violence as a means to achieve political
objectives. Ulster's referendum to endorse Good Friday and release paramilitary prison-
ers may result in the marginalization of paramilitary activists. Before the referendum,
Ulster's cultural identity had not been democratically resolved. In addition, Nationalists
felt the British presence in Ireland was illegitimate. Consequently, Britain's imposition
of criminal sanctions for Republican paramilitary activity was illegitimate as well. In
short, the wellspring of justice - the state - was the source of injustice, rather than the
remedy.
The referendums alter this dynamic. Ulster's identity has now been democratically
resolved: Ulster retains political ties to Britain with wide latitude to govern itself
through the new Assembly. As a consequence, the state is now legitimate, and therefore
the justification for sectarian violence is nullified. Of course, nullifying the justification
only applies to Republican paramilitary activity. Theoretically, this should be sufficient
to nullify the justification for all sectarian violence. Republican violence can no longer
exist because the state is legitimate. Britain's continued presence in Ulster is a conse-
quence of the democratic will, rather than British imperialism. If Republican violence is
now illegitimate, the Loyalist violence it triggered is now illegitimate as well. Thus, the
legitimization of the state, and the corresponding legitimization of criminal sanctions for
sectarian violence, trigger the following result: neither side has a viable justification to
continue with sectarian violence. Both Republicans and Loyalists are now "relegated" to
political avenues for change. As a result, paramilitary activists are marginalized because
159. Reverend Ian Paisley feared the consequences of Good Friday for this reason. In addressing the release
of paramilitary prisoners he asks, "what happens then? Then you get a gun on your head again, and the IRA
says, 'We want something more."' Northern Ireland Secretary Mo Mowlam, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jun. 10,
1998, available in 1998 WL 6679373. This sentiment is partially justified. Some Nationalists have been
hesitant to rush to decommissioning. See Honore, supra note 6 (noting that Nationalists feel that they "want to
know [the IRA] still has some guns around the place...you never know how things will turn out here." ).
160.. It is hard to criticize the logic behind the idea that "[tlhe people of Northern Ireland do not accept the
bona fides of terrorists." Rachel Donnelly, Torries Vote Against Bill on Prisoner Releases, IRISH TIMES, Jun.
10, 1998, at 8 available in 1998 WL 6248060 (describing the Conservative MPs in Westminster who voted
against the Sentences Act). Although many citizens of Ulster endorsed Good Friday, it is easy to understand
why victims (typically Unionist) of sectarian violence have been skeptical of claims from paramilitaries that
paramilitary prisoners no longer pose a threat to society.
161. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 147 ("'[G]uerrila warfare basically derives from the masses and is
supported by them,' it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and
cooperation."' Id. (quoting Mao Tsetung)). As a normative model, we hope Tsetung's statement is true for two
reasons. First, it suggests the possibility that peace will be at hand once the community supporting terrorism
receives justice. This allows us to assume terrorism is a malignancy that can be cured when the state offers the
proper remedy. Second, perhaps sub-conscioulsy, it allows us to reconcile the tragedy of terrorism with the




terrorist organizations are dependent upon popular support to survive.'16 Thus, now that
Ulster's citizens have paid the "price" for ending sectarian violence, they may now de-
mand the product.1
62
In addition, the degree to which utilitarianism's criminal deterrence is nullified un-
der the Sentencing Act is proportional to the political bargaining power that paramilita-
ries have in Ulster. If potential paramilitary activists construe the Sentencing Act to
suggest that incarcerated activists are released when they have political allies who can
bargain for their release (completely nullifying deterrence), it follows that deterrence
remains intact when paramilitary activists lose their political allies, or when their politi-
cal allies lose their power at the bargaining table. Thankfully, Omagh suggests that the
bargaining power of paramilitaries is in fast decline. 163 Conceivably, the deaths from
Omagh may trigger a backlash in the law-abiding but previously paramilitary-supporting
Johnson notes that terrorist groups such as the IRA are so reliant on terrorism as a means to their
political ends that they have little chance of ever exercising legitimate authority:
[O]ne wonders whether the . . .IRA. . . .would ever be able to overcome the heritage
of their own past and exercise genuine political authority . . . .A social system in
equilibrium is a moral community, one based on mutual trust and on values that define
roles and legitimate a division of labor. Political terrorism is a form of tyranny, not
something to which people can become accustomed and thereby orient their own
behavior. Can revolutionary terrorists abandon their own earlier activities? More to
the point, can citizens of a regime dominated by ex-terrorists fail to repeat Cassius's
question: "Upon what meat doth this our Caesar feed that he is grown so great?"
Political terrorism, in short, is as likely to cause a revolution against those who use it
as it is to serve them.
Id. at 168.
While Johnson may be right to assume that "the IRA" will be unable to abandon violence once it,
achieves power, he ignores that legitimate governments rely on force to maintain authority. The central
question is whether the polity supports the legitimacy of the government, and therefore the government's right
to force as an instrumentality of order, peace, and security. In Ulster, neither side has clean hands. Both
Unionist and Loyalist political factions have killed innocent civilians, and many Republicans would extend
this indictment to the British government as well. The fact that a state actor - Britain - has used the coercive
power inherent in its authority to perpetuate order and punish criminality furthers justice; but it furthers justice
not because it punishes the violent act, but because the majority of the community supports the use of state
power to punish the violent act.
162. Of course, this argument does not address the fact that paramilitary activists may simply continue to
operate without any popular basis for their activity. They could choose to simply be disgruntled regardless of
their waning support in the population. But if this is the case, paramilitary activity is no longer political crime,
its simply crime based on a malignant mens rea. By definition, this crime exists without popular support in
almost all societies. Once popular support is gone, the structural base of sectarian violence is gone. The
optimistic hope is that the lack of popular support will end Ulster's structural political problem, which should
at least reduce the actual amount of sectarian violence Ulster endures.
163. Ireland's Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Ahern said that Ireland is ready to "crush" the paramilitary
campaign of splinter groups such as the 'Real IRA'. His opposition in the Dail (the Irish parliament) "called
for an all-Ireland security initiative and said those responsible for the bombing were addicted to violence and
had no place in a civilised society." Michael O'Regan, Those Behind Bombing 'Addicted to Violence,' IRISH
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1998, at 11. The fact that opposing political parties in Ireland are united in their denunciation
of paramilitary splinter violence suggests that it has the popular support to take stringent efforts at countering
paramilitary violence. In addition, Britain recently passed anti-terrorist legislation designed to counter any
attempts to thwart the peace process. See Newton, supra note 127 (describing British Prime Minister Blair's
support for the anti-terrorist legislation). If these political trends continue, it suggests that political leaders may
begin to turn a deaf ear to the arguments of paramilitary actors. Furthermore, an earlier episode of post-Good
Friday paramilitary violence resulted in the death of three small boys. Their house had been fire-bombed by
Loyalists because their mother was in a "mixed" relationship - she was co-habitating with a Catholic man. The
mother and one of her four sons survived. The polity was so riveted by the event that the responsible terrorists
were marginalized; one commentator noted: "even members of whatever religious community or political
group those responsible may belong to will be unlikely to protect them." T.R. Reid, Tiny Coffins in N. Ireland,
WASH. POST, Jul. 15, 1998, at A22 (describing the attack).
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community.' 64 The referendum endorsing Good Friday suggests that Ulster is becoming
exhausted by paramilitary violence and increasingly intolerant of sectarian violence that
now exists in violation of a democratic mandate for the provisions of Good Friday.
In addition, the Utilitarian paradigm utilizes a valuation of the net change in societal
utility to evaluate the Sentencing Act.165 The Sentencing Act could conceivably fail to
increase social utility on its own terms. However, this does not eradicate the possibility
that early prisoner release may be part of a long-term process whose final stage will
pacify paramilitary violence, creating a net increase in social utility. Admittedly, this
does little to salve the wound of Omagh. But it does not need to. The Sentencing Act
applies to paramilitary activists convicted before the announcement of Good Friday.
166
Only those criminals were released. Ulster may justifiably maintain or even increase the
criminal sanctions against post-Good Friday paramilitary activity in order to comply
with the democratic mandate for peaceful political change.
V. Conclusion
Justice without force is impotent;
Force without justice is tyranny. 67
To many who revere the rule of law, the Sentences Act was a disillusioning example
of legitimate government catering to terrorists. On the floor of the House of Lords, Lord
Tebbit lamented the Sentencing Act, saying "[tihere can be no peace without justice and
[the Sentences Act] reeks and stinks of injustice." It is easy to understand his sentiments.
Releasing incarcerated terrorists because free terrorists demand it does little to perpetu-
ate standard constructions of justice under the law. Simultaneously, this assessment is
tempered by the fact that prisoner release was approved by the society victimized by
sectarian violence. These voters believed what Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams had
told them: "[p]art of a peace settlement has to involve the release of all of the prison-
ers.' 68
Justice lies in eye of the observer. While Immanuel Kant might have envisioned a
definition of justice that could exist independent of human observance, communities
cannot be pressed to comport their decisions with Kant's metaphysical notion of justice
above their own. Ulsterians have chosen to release prisoners that would have faced a
death sentence in many parts of the world. While it is hard for an outside observer to
view this release as being a healthy or judicial choice, it is equally hard for an outside
observer to imagine life in a society riddled with sectarian violence. The Sentences Act
flies in the face of standard constructions of justice, but the standard paradigm is invalid
in Northern Ireland: throughout most of the Troubles, criminal punishment in Northern
Ireland was seen by many as part of the oppression that causes the violence, rather than
part of the cure. Ulster's acceptance of Good Friday and prisoner release reveals the
majority's will to endure steps it deems necessary to initiate peace because these steps
legitimize the exercise of government authority and criminal sanctions. The cure begins
164. Mr. Blair emphasized the fact that post-Good Friday paramilitary activity now exists in contravention
of the democratic will. See id. ("[Good Friday] had been endorsed by people, North and South, and it had to be
implemented. A small, fanatical, unrepresentative group could not be allowed to wreck the future of the people
of Northern Ireland.").
165. See BENTHAM, supra note 145 (describing utilitarian methodology of evaluating policy).
166. See Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, supra note 133 (stating prerequisites of a prisoner's release).
167. Margaret Miner and Hugh Rawson, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 164
(1993). (quoting Pascal).
168. T.R. Reid and Dan Balz, supra note 132, at A39.
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to counter the disease, rather than exacerbate its symptoms. In this context, the primary
gain from the Sentences Act is that the state's imposition of criminal sanctions is legiti-
mized in the eyes of all Ulsterians. Once state authority is legitimate, the Sentences Act,
rather than paramilitary activity, becomes the ascendant instrumentality of justice.
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